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Higher Education, Productivity Revelation and 
Performance-pay Jobs† 
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This paper examines the differences between the subsequent careers of 
high school and college graduate workers based on a direct role of 
college graduation with regard to the revelation of workers’ individual 
abilities. Using NLSY79, we document a positive relationship between 
off-the-job training/performance-pay jobs and ability for high school 
graduates at the early stages of their careers. However, this relationship 
is less prominent for college graduates. Moreover, we show that high 
ability is associated with more jobs, which reflects higher job mobility, 
only for high school graduates. We argue that these patterns are the 
result of productivity-revealing behavior of high school graduates, 
whose individual abilities, unlike college graduates, is not observed 
precisely at the beginning of their careers. 
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  I. Introduction 
 
ince Spence (1973), one of well-known functions of higher education has been 
to signal ability. In the traditional signaling model, individuals with high ability 
reveal their ability by sorting into higher education. However, a recent paper by 
Arcidiacono, Bayer, and Hizmo (2010) (ABH (2010) hereafter) finds that college 
graduation plays a direct role in revealing the productivity of individuals to the 
labor market rather than simply categorizing these individuals as college graduates. 
In particular, ABH (2010) documents how the wages of college graduates are
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correlated with their own abilities, whereas this is not the case for the wages of 
high school graduates, at least not in the beginning of their careers.1 There are 
several additional studies that document the pooling of young high school 
graduates. For instance, Bishop (1994) and Rosenbaum (1990) demonstrate that 
having both cognitive and non-cognitive skills—both of which are believed to be 
related to productivity—is not reflected in the wages of young high school 
graduates. Thus, at the early stages of their careers, high-ability high school 
graduates tend to be “pooled” with low-ability high school graduates. 
The goal of this paper is to document the effects of higher education on the post- 
schooling careers of workers based on the role of higher education, i.e., to reveal 
ability. In particular, based on evidence of the role of higher education in revealing 
ability, we argue that this role yields clear implications regarding workers’ 
productivity-revealing behaviors after they enter the job market. To be more 
accurate, if the individual abilities of high school graduates are not directly 
observable, high-ability high school graduates will not be appropriately 
compensated. Thus, their wages will be set based on the average ability of high 
school graduates. As a result, it is likely that high-ability high school graduates will 
engage in activities that will separate them from low-ability high school graduates 
after they start their careers. More specifically, we predict that high-ability high 
school graduates will be more likely to obtain off-the-job training and more likely 
to sort themselves into performance-pay jobs in which wages are closely related to 
individual ability. 
Unlike high school graduates, high-ability college graduates are not expected to 
engage in costly activities to separate themselves from those with low ability given 
that the abilities of college graduates are already apparent from the beginning of 
their careers. Thus, the probability of participating in off-the-job training and 
sorting into performance-pay jobs would not be positively correlated with the 
measure of ability among college graduates at the early stages of their careers. 
Moreover, we expect that high-ability high school graduates tend to have more jobs 
than their low-ability counterparts considering that they move to better jobs. 
However, college graduates will not necessarily exhibit this pattern. Specifically, 
as college graduates are assigned to jobs according to their abilities from the 
beginning of their careers, they do not have to change jobs at the cost of firm-
specific human capital. Thus, job mobility among college graduates will be 
determined by factors that are not related to worker abilities, such as a random job 
match between an employer and an employee. 
We examine these patterns of worker’s post-schooling behaviors using NLSY79 
data by documenting different relationships between AFQT scores and 
productivity-revealing activities across high school and college graduates. These 
patterns coincide with the prediction of the signaling model under a different 
degree of asymmetric information between employers and workers across the two 
groups. 
This paper contributes to the literature by illustrating the role of post-schooling 
 
1Many aspects of college education can identify the abilities of young college graduates; in Hoxby (1997), 
college students’ abilities are homogeneous within a university but heterogeneous across universities. Given the 
sorting of students by the ranking or selectivity of colleges, potential employers can obtain fairly accurate 
information about college graduates via the names of their alma maters. 
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signaling as a possible mechanism explaining how the wages of workers with only 
a high school degree eventually reflect their individual abilities. Since the seminal 
work of Farber and Gibbons (1996), the role of the employer learning on wage 
dynamics—young workers’ wages eventually being positively related to AFQT 
scores—is well documented by several papers (Altonji and Pierret, 2001; Bauer 
and Haisken-Denew, 2001). The basic employer learning model hinges on public 
or symmetric employer learning, assuming that the current employer’s information 
about the workers is shared with all potential employers. However, the existence of 
private or asymmetric learning of employers—and the game theory issues related 
to it—can complicate the plausible mechanism of employer learning. As a result, 
only a small number of papers such as Schönberg (2007) and Pinkston (2009) have 
proposed an employer learning mechanism that explains wage dynamics under 
private or asymmetric learning of employers. However, given the high mobility of 
high school graduates in the early stages of their career (Topel and Ward, 1992), it 
seems unrealistic that information about average young workers could be 
accumulated in a short time and then passed to outside employers through a rather 
complicated process without significant losses of the information. 
By focusing on the incentives of high-ability workers to reveal their productivity, 
this paper provides an alternative story regarding the wage dynamics of young 
workers. Unlike employers who do not have an incentive to reveal information 
about their high-ability workers, high-ability workers have a strong incentive to 
reveal their abilities to their potential employers through productivity-revealing 
activities. Because the worker will signal their abilities to all potential employers, 
one does not have to consider the transmission of information across employers. 
Moreover, explaining wage dynamics using workers’ incentives is more intuitive 
than relying on employer learning, as it emphasizes the role of workers who will 
actually gain from the revelation of productivity and its related wage increases.2 
The rest of this paper is organized into the following sections. Section II provides 
an overview of NLSY79 and the sample construction process. In Section III, we 
describe individuals' sorting behaviors into higher education and draw testable 
implications regarding subsequent aspects of post-schooling careers followed by 
the identification strategy and the estimating equations. In Section IV, we present 
the main empirical results that verify the hypotheses regarding productivity-
revealing activities and the number of jobs. Section V presents concluding remarks. 
 
II. Data 
 
To verify our hypotheses regarding workers’ post-school behaviors empirically, 
we use NLSY79 data for the period of 1979-2006. This dataset has been compiled 
at regular intervals (annually since 1979 and biannually since 1994). The 
respondents were aged between 14 and 22 at the beginning of the survey. The data 
have a number of advantages for analyzing post-schooling signaling behaviors. In 
particular, NLSY79 focuses on the early stage of respondents’ careers, when 
 
2Employers will be indifferent about the wage distribution in this setting as long as the average wage equals 
the average productivity of workers. 
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productivity-revealing activities are most likely to have an impact. Moreover, for 
the focused analysis of post-school behaviors here, information regarding workers’ 
abilities is essential. NLSY79 contains the results of AVSAB tests, which can be 
converted into AFQT scores. AFQT scores in NLSY79 are widely accepted as a 
pre-market measure of ability. Lastly, the data contain detailed information about 
the training of workers and their job characteristics, including the payment 
structures of jobs. 
For the main analysis, we restrict the sample to white males in order to avoid 
tracking career variations that may arise from differences in race and/or gender.3 
Following ABH (2010), we also limit the sample to the respondents who have 
completed 12 or 16 years of education and exclude high school dropouts and 
individuals who have completed some college education. We exclude respondents 
who have military jobs or, jobs without pay, who are self-employed in CPS (main) 
jobs, or who work for a family business. We also drop labor market experience 
accumulated before individuals left school for the first time. Furthermore, we 
restrict our scope of the analysis to individuals for whom the potential experience 
duration is less than 13 years, thereby focusing on the early stages of their careers.4 
Another reason for this sample construction stipulation, as explained in ABH 
(2010), is to keep the analysis simple by focusing on the approximately linear 
region of the relationship between log wages, AFQT scores, and potential 
experience. 
The measure of ability, i.e., the AFQT score, is constructed using the definition 
provided by the Department of Defense and is standardized according to the age of 
the individual at the time of the test. The construction of the performance-pay 
indicator variable follows the method used by Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent 
(2009). The performance-pay indicator variable takes a value equal to one if the 
wages of CPS jobs include a variable-pay component, such as a bonus, commission 
or piece-rate structure. With regard to the off-the-job training variable, we follow 
Parent (1999) and reclassify 12 training categories into three groups: on-the-job 
training (OJT), off-the-job training (OFT) and apprenticeships. In particular, the 
OFT indicator variable takes a value equal to one if the respondent took any form 
of OFT, such as by attending a business college, a nursing program or a vocational-
technical institute, in a given year. We use the hourly wage rate of CPS jobs from 
the work history file as a measure of wages and obtain the real wage using the CPI 
index. The number of jobs in a given year is used as a proxy for the job mobility of 
workers. 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the main analysis of the sample. As 
expected, the average of log wages and the average AFQT scores are higher for 
college graduates than for high school graduates. College graduates are more likely 
to take performance-pay jobs and to obtain training. Additionally, the compositions 
of training differ between the two groups, as high school graduates are more likely 
to obtain OFT and apprenticeships and are less likely to obtain OJT. However, there 
 
3In Appendix, we include results based on all racial groups. These results are consistent with our main 
findings. 
4Potential experience is defined as the number of years since a respondent initially finished their schooling. 
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TABLE 1—SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 High School College Total 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
AFQT 0.323 0.797 1.272 0.454 0.595 0.835 
Potential Experience 6.213 3.309 5.346 3.051 5.966 3.261 
Log of Real Wage 6.409 0.474 6.837 0.537 6.530 0.529 
Number of Jobs 4.621 3.746 2.982 2.588 4.156 3.535 
Performance-pay Jobs (%) 24.12  38.94  28.93  
Training (%) 11.22  18.42  13.25  
Off-the-Job Training (%) 50.63  38.11  45.73  
On-the-Job Training (%) 41.79  67.19  51.73  
Apprenticeship (%) 11.11  3.54  8.15  
Region (%)       
Northeast 19.94  27.88  22.18  
North Central 35.87  28.44  33.77  
South 27.20  28.77  27.64  
West 16.99  14.91  16.40  
Urban Residence (%) 71.85  87.48  76.24  
Number of Observations 7,716  3,058  10,774  
Number of Individuals 988  437  1,425  
Note: The average and standard deviations are calculated over individual-by-year observations coming from a 
panel of 1979-2006. S.D. stands for standard deviation. Please refer to Section II for a detailed description of the 
variables. 
 
is little difference in the number of jobs per year between college and high school 
graduates. 
 
III. Empirical Framework 
 
In this section, we describe individual’s sorting behavior into higher education 
and draw testable implications regarding subsequent aspects of post-schooling 
careers. This is followed by descriptions of the identification strategy and the 
estimating equations. 
In order to illustrate workers’ postgraduate productivity-revealing activities, we 
assume that each worker has innate ability a , distributed as ( )F a , and that 
employers do not have direct information about any individual worker’s innate 
ability. First, an individual decides whether they will sort themselves into higher 
education or not. Under the commonly acknowledged assumptions of returns and 
the cost of engaging in higher education, a certain percentage of individuals from 
the top of the ability distribution have incentives to participate in higher education. 
Specifically, there is an ability cutoff *a  such that individuals whose ability is 
greater than *a  would receive higher education. Individuals who decide to 
receive higher education become college graduates and individuals who decide not 
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to enter higher education remain high school graduates.5 After individuals finish 
their schooling and enter the job market, they then decide whether to engage in 
activities that will further reveal their abilities. Employers know that the average 
ability of college graduates is higher than the average ability of high school 
graduates. Moreover, given the role of higher education in revealing ability, college 
graduates will receive wages according to their individual abilities. However, with 
regard to wages, high school graduates will be pooled at the beginning of their 
careers, as employers cannot verify the individual abilities of fresh high school 
graduates. Thus, the wages of college graduate workers are positively correlated 
with their ability a , whereas the wages of high school graduates at the beginning 
of their careers will be the expected ability of high school graduate workers, 
( | *)E a a a , regardless of individual abilities a  assuming a perfectly 
competitive labor market. 
Thus, given these initial wages of high school graduates, some portion of high-
ability high school graduates have incentives to engage in productivity-revealing 
activities to separate themselves from low-ability high school graduates and 
ultimately to gain compensation for their individual abilities. However, high-ability 
college graduates will not engage in costly productivity-revealing activities 
because they are already separated from both high school graduates and low-ability 
college graduates. We exploit this predicted difference in productivity-revealing 
activities, such as participation in off-the-job training and taking performance-pay 
jobs, between high school and college graduates to identify the effects of higher 
education on an individual’s postgraduate career. In addition, we argue that job 
mobility will exhibit different patterns among high school and college graduates. 
 
A. Off-the-Job Training 
 
The literature on training mainly focuses on the human-capital-mediated effect 
of training on wage increases or job mobility (Lynch, 1991; 1992; Parent, 1999). In 
contrast, here we view training mainly as a means of revealing worker productivity. 
In particular, off-the-job training (OFT) is similar to schooling in the sense that the 
worker pays the cost of the training, while the contents of the training are not firm- 
specific. Given the similarities between off-the-job training and schooling, off-the- 
job training can be used as a signaling device. Thus, as traditional signaling theory 
(Spence, 1973) would predict, high-ability workers will be more likely to obtain 
OFT than their low-ability counterparts if they are not differentiated from their 
low-ability counterparts. 
Therefore, for high school graduates whose abilities are not revealed at the 
beginning of their careers, the probability of receiving off-the-job training will be 
positively related to their AFQT scores, as high-ability high school graduates 
would participate in OFT to reveal their ability. However, for college graduates 
whose individual abilities are already apparent, the probability of obtaining OFT 
will not necessarily depend positively on measured ability. Moreover, because the 
 
5It is important to note that the predictions and implications drawn in this section will be independent of 
whether the return is from signaling or human capital accumulation. That is, motivation for education does not 
matter as long as high-ability individuals proceed to higher education. 
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return from being separated from low-ability workers decreases with time, the 
probability of obtaining OFT will decrease more rapidly with experience for high-
ability high school graduates compared to their low-ability counterparts. In other 
words, the experience gradient will be steeper for high-ability high school 
graduates whose motivation for taking OFT is positively affected by both signaling 
(productivity revealing) and human capital accumulation. However, we do not 
expect different experience gradients across abilities among college graduates 
given that high-ability college graduates do not have additional incentives to 
receive OFT in the early stages of their careers. 
If OFT functions as a productivity-revealing device, one may consider that high-
ability high school graduates would also be separated from low-ability high school 
graduates as soon as they take OFT and thus would be paid according to their 
ability. However, the strength of the signal from OFT is weaker than that of college 
education. Therefore, the ability of high school graduate workers with OFT would 
be revealed gradually, unlike college graduates. 
 
B. Performance-pay Jobs 
 
A recent paper by Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009) asserts that due to 
imperfect information about workers, high-ability workers will have an incentive to 
sort themselves into performance-pay jobs so that they can reveal their high 
productivity and receive wages that more closely reflect their abilities. Lemieux, 
MacLeod, and Parent (2009) supports this argument by comparing the average 
AFQT score for workers in performance-pay jobs with that of workers in non-
performance-pay jobs. Adopting their view on performance-pay jobs, one can 
categorize sorting behavior into performance-pay jobs as a means to reveal the 
productivity of individual workers. Thus, given the role of higher education, the 
relationship between ability and having a performance-pay job among high school 
graduates will be different from that among college graduates. 
To be more specific, because high school graduates are pooled with each other at 
the beginning of their careers, high-ability high school graduates would try to take 
performance-pay jobs and receive pay in relation to their individual abilities. 
However, unlike high school graduates, high-ability college graduates are already 
distinguished from their low-ability counterparts at the beginning of their careers. 
Thus, high-ability college graduates will have little incentive to choose to take 
performance-pay jobs and pay additional monitoring costs to reveal their high 
abilities. In other words, it is not necessary for high-ability college graduates to sort 
themselves into performance-pay jobs; in fact it could be considered wasteful in the 
early stages of their careers. 
In sum, the probability of obtaining performance-pay jobs will depend positively 
on AFQT scores among high school graduates in the early stages of their careers, 
whereas among college graduates, the correlation between the probability of 
working at a performance-pay job and the AFQT score will not be positive.6 
 
6A difference in the probability of working at performance-pay jobs between high school and college graduate 
workers can still exist, as college graduates are more likely to sort themselves into performance-pay jobs. This fact 
does not contradict our explanation given that the difference between average high school and college graduates 
can be explained by other factors, such as differences in the job characteristics of college and high school 
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C. Number of Jobs 
 
The positive relationship between wage increases and job mobility for young 
high school graduates has been well documented by Topel and Ward (1992). They 
interpret the results as supportive evidence of the search theory, viewing job 
mobility as an important means of wage increases and as a step toward stable long-
term employment for high school graduates.7 
In our paper, we examine the number of jobs that workers take in a given year. 
This number is regarded as a measure reflecting the job mobility of workers. In 
particular, high-ability high school graduates will be more likely to exhibit higher 
job mobility than low-ability high school graduates as they engage in productivity-
revealing activities to differentiate themselves from their low-ability counterparts 
and to move to better jobs. Thus, there will be a positive relationship between wage 
increases and the number of jobs among high school graduates, as high-ability high 
school workers seek and switch to better jobs with higher wages. Moreover, as 
high-ability high school graduates obtain the jobs they deserve, the incentive to 
move to other jobs will decrease over time and their careers will eventually 
stabilize. This implies that the negative relationship between the number of jobs 
and potential experience will be stronger for the high-ability high school graduates 
than for low-ability high school graduates. 
However, high-ability college graduate workers will not have an incentive to 
move between jobs at the cost of firm-specific human capital, as college graduates 
are offered jobs according to their individual abilities from the beginning of their 
careers. That is, high-ability college graduate workers will not have to engage in 
costly job searches and endure the related job mobility to separate themselves from 
their low-ability counterparts in the early stages of their careers. 
 
D. Estimating Equation 
 
In this section, we document the different patterns of the relationship between 
ability and outcomes among high school and college graduates discussed in the 
earlier part of this section. We claim this difference as evidence supporting the 
effects of higher education on the subsequent careers of workers. To be specific, 
we verify a positive relationship between the incidence of productivity-revealing 
activities and ability among high school graduates, while we find a non-positive 
relationship among college graduates. We attribute this difference between the two 
groups to differences in their participation rates of productivity-revealing activities 
given the role of college graduation. 
The main empirical specification closely follows employer learning literature 
and regresses the outcome variable on a measure of ability, potential experience, 
and the interaction between the two (Altonji and Pierret, 2001). The following 
equation will be estimated separately for high school graduate and college graduate 
workers, 
                                                                                                         
graduates. 
7Unlike Topel and Ward (1992), Neumark (2002) views job mobility as a wasteful procedure. He argues that 
judgments of job mobility can differ between high school and college graduates. 
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(1)  0 1 2 ( ) Xit i i it it it t itY AFQT AFQT Exper f Exper e            , 
where itY  is the outcome variable, in this case the wage of worker i  in time t , 
the number of jobs held in a given year, and a dummy variable for having a 
performance-pay job and engaging in off-the-job training. itExper  represents i ’s 
potential experience at time t  and ( )itf Exper  is a function of itExper . In the 
main analysis, we adopt a third-order polynomial function for potential experience. 
Xit  includes the control variables such as the region of residence. The error term 
ite  is clustered at the individual level. 
The coefficient of iAFQT , 1 , indicates the correlation between the outcome 
variable and AFQT score at the beginning of an individual’s career—when their 
potential experience is equal to zero. The coefficient of the interaction term, 2 , 
captures the difference in the correlation between experience and outcome across 
workers with different abilities. Our hypothesis will be supported by examining the 
differences in the statistical significance and the signs of the coefficients in each 
group. 
 
IV. Results 
 
This section provides empirical results that verify our hypotheses regarding 
participation in the productivity-revealing activities and job mobility of workers. 
We perform a regression analysis using equation (1) with various dependent 
variables, in this case indicators of receiving OFT and taking performance-pay jobs 
separately for high school graduate and college graduate samples. Tables 2 through 
5 report the results from the regression for each group of workers for the dependent 
variables, and they also provide p-values from tests comparing the coefficients 
based on the two different samples. Specifically, columns (1) and (3) of each table 
report the result of estimating equation (1) without the interaction term between 
AFQT and potential experience for high school and college graduates, respectively. 
Therefore, the estimated coefficients of AFQT in columns (1) and (3) indicate the 
overall relationship between AFQT and the outcome variable for the first 13 years 
of the workers’ careers. Columns (2) and (4) report the estimation result of the 
equation (1) for high school and college graduates, respectively. 
 
A. Does Higher Education Fulfill the Role of Revealing Ability? 
Replication of ABH (2010) 
 
Before we present our main results, we present the regression result using wage 
as a dependent variable, which will confirm that our main sample exhibits a result 
regarding wage dynamics identical to that in ABH (2010). That is, we show that 
the wages of college graduate workers are correlated with their own abilities at the 
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beginning of their careers, while the wages of high school graduate workers are 
not, at least in the beginning of their careers. Table 2 presents the results from 
estimating equation (1) with the log of real wage as an outcome variable separately 
for high school graduates and college graduates. It shows that our results regarding 
wages are qualitatively similar to those in ABH (2010). In particular, the AFQT 
coefficient in column (2) is positive but small and statistically insignificant, which 
implies that the wages of high school graduates do not reflect their cognitive 
abilities at the beginning of their careers — when their potential experience is zero. 
The positive and significant coefficient of the interaction term between AFQT 
scores and potential experience implies that the wages of high school graduates 
eventually reflect their individual abilities. In other words, high school graduates 
are pooled with each other at the beginning of their careers but are eventually 
separated by their AFQT scores. On the other hand, the coefficient of the AFQT 
score estimated with the college graduate sample, shown in column (4), is sizable, 
positive and significant, whereas the interaction term is small and insignificant. 
This result implies that college graduates are separated by their AFQT scores from 
the beginning of their careers and that the additional separation associated with 
experience is insignificant, unlike high school graduates. Taking into account that 
the variations in the AFQT scores are much smaller among college graduates than 
among high school graduates, this result appears to provide strong support for the 
argument that higher education has a productivity-revealing role. 
 
TABLE 2—REPLICATING ABH (2010) 
 
High School College Test: College=HS P-value 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
AFQT 0.0765***(.016) 
0.00150 
(.0173) 
0.191*** 
(.0431) 
0.152** 
(.0599) 0.013 0.015 
Exper/10 1.192*** (.1931) 
1.172*** 
(.1937) 
1.314*** 
(.3793) 
1.185*** 
(.3718) 0.775 0.976 
AFQT*Exper/10  0.113*** (.0243)  
0.0617 
(.0902)  0.582 
Adjusted R-squared 0.133 0.154 0.139 0.150   
N 7,406 7,194 2,970 2,850   
Additional Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Note: All specifications include a year fixed effect and squared and cubic terms for potential experience. 
Specifications (2) and (4) additionally control for the location of the residence and an urban residence. In columns 
(5) and (6), we report the p-values for the difference in the coefficients from specifications (1) and (3) as well as 
(2) and (4), respectively. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. *** significant at the 
1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.   
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B. Off-the-Job Training 
 
Table 3 summarizes the results regarding off-the-job training separately for the 
high school graduate and college graduate samples. For high school graduates, the 
AFQT coefficient in column (2) is positive and statistically significant, which 
implies that high-ability high school graduates are more likely to engage in OFT 
than their low-ability counterparts at the beginning of careers. Moreover, the 
negative coefficient of the interaction term between AFQT scores and potential 
experience implies that high-ability high school graduates are more likely to 
undertake an OFT at the beginning of their careers compared to low-ability high 
school graduates. This result also supports our hypotheses, as the return for 
revealing productivity through OFT is higher in the early stages of a career. Thus, 
high-ability high school graduates will engage in OFT more intensively in the 
earlier stages of their careers. 
The results based on the college graduate sample show a different pattern. They 
show that the probability of engaging in OFT does not depend positively on the 
AFQT scores in the early stages of their careers, as the AFQT coefficient in 
column (4) is not statistically significant. The positive coefficient of the interaction 
term between AFQT scores and potential experience is evidence against the 
possibility of OFT being used as a productivity-revealing device for high-ability 
college graduates. If OFT is used as a productivity-revealing device for high-ability 
college graduate workers, they would have received OFT more in the early stages 
of their careers and the coefficient of AFQT and the interaction term would 
accordingly have exhibited the same patterns as they do for high school graduates. 
Overall, the evidence supports the contention that for college graduates, revealing 
productivity is not a dominant motivation for receiving OFT. 
 
TABLE 3—OFF-THE-JOB TRAINING 
 
High School College Test: College=HS P-value 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
AFQT 0.0121***(.0038) 
0.0258***
(.0075) 
0.000374 
(.0129) 
-0.0396 
(.0245) 0.382 0.010 
Exper/10 -0.497***(.1219) 
-0.481***
(.1237) 
-0.0561 
(.1857) 
-0.152 
(.1989) 0.047 0.160 
AFQT*Exper/10  -0.0235**(.0114)  
0.0790** 
(.0364)  0.007 
Adjusted R-squared 0.008 0.009     
N 6,769 6,573 2,683 2,576   
Additional Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Note: All specifications include a year fixed effect and squared and cubic terms for potential experience. 
Specifications (2) and (4) additionally control for the location of the residence and an urban residence. In columns 
(5) and (6), we report the p-values for the difference in the coefficients from specifications (1) and (3) as well as 
(2) and (4), respectively. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. *** significant at the 
1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.  
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C. Performance-pay Jobs 
 
As discussed earlier in Section III. B, high school graduates with high ability 
would have an incentive to work at performance-pay jobs in the early stages of 
their careers in order to receive pay reflecting their individual abilities, whereas 
college graduates would have limited incentives to choose performance-pay jobs. 
Therefore, if our hypotheses are correct, we would find a positive coefficient of 
AFQT scores for high school graduates according to equation (1) with an indicator 
of having a performance-pay job as an outcome variable. For college graduates, we 
expect a non-positive AFQT coefficient. 
Note that our main specification for the result regarding performance-pay jobs 
will only have the AFQT score and measure of potential experience as the main 
independent variables due to data limitations. The data from the question about 
performance-pay jobs were collected between 1988 and 1990 and between 1996 
and 2000, when most of respondents had already gained approximately from 7 to 8 
years of potential experience. As a result, the estimation of 1  in equation (1), 
which estimates the AFQT scores and the outcome at the beginning of workers’ 
careers, will be unreliable when we include the interaction between AFQT scores 
and potential experience. Moreover, because the collection of information about 
performance pay is not continuous, 2 , which estimates the relationship between 
performance pay and experience, will also be unreliable. Thus, we only look at 
whether sorting into a performance-pay job depends on AFQT for the first 13 years 
of the workers’ careers. Thus, the our hypotheses will be verified by examining 
whether there is a difference in the relationship between having a performance-pay 
job and ability in the first 13 years of an individual’s career across the two groups. 
 
TABLE 4—PERFORMANCE-PAY JOBS 
 
High School College Test: College=HS P-value 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
AFQT 0.0351** (.0138) 
0.153** 
(.0605) 
-0.0334 
(.0481) 
-0.209** 
(.0939) 0.171 0.002 
Exper/10 1.275 (1.176) 
0.858 
(1.227) 
2.213*** 
(.7505) 
2.103*** 
(.7695) 0.501 0.390 
AFQT*Exper/10  -0.118* (.0669)  
0.307** 
(.1436)  0.007 
Adjusted R-squared 0.003 0.007 0.018 0.027   
N 1,917 1,898 933 922   
Additional Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Note: All specifications include a year fixed effect and squared and cubic terms for potential experience. 
Specifications (2) and (4) additionally control for the location of the residence and an urban residence. In columns 
(5) and (6), we report the p-values for the difference in the coefficients from specifications (1) and (3) as well as 
(2) and (4), respectively. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. *** significant at the 
1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.  
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Our estimation results support the described different patterns of taking 
performance-pay jobs between high school and college graduate workers. As 
shown in column (1) of Table 4, the probability of having a performance-pay job 
depends positively on the AFQT score for high school graduates in the first 13 
years of their careers. This result is consistent with our hypotheses that high-ability 
high school graduates will work at performance-pay jobs to reveal their ability in 
the early stages of their careers. 
However, for college graduates, AFQT scores are not positively associated with 
the probability of obtaining performance-pay jobs during the early stages of their 
careers, as the coefficient in column (3) is negative and statistically insignificant. 
The estimation result for college graduates shows that high-ability college 
graduates have little incentive to take performance-pay jobs under productivity-
revealing motives, unlike high school graduate workers. 
 
D. Number of Jobs 
 
In order to examine our hypotheses described in Section III. C regarding number 
of jobs, we use the number of jobs in a given year as a dependent variable in 
equation (1), and Table 5 documents the results. As the coefficient of AFQT in 
column (2) is positive, the number of jobs is positively related to ability among 
high school graduates at the beginning of their careers. In particular, an increase of 
one standard deviation in the AFQT scores is associated with 0.15 more jobs in the 
early stages of high school graduates’ careers. The coefficient of the interaction 
term is negative for high school graduates. This result implies that the number of 
jobs among high-ability high school graduates will eventually stabilize over time. 
 
TABLE 5—NUMBER OF JOBS 
 
High School College Test: College=HS P-value 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
AFQT 0.0613***(.0193) 
0.152*** 
(.0364) 
-0.138***
(.0499) 
-0.143 
(.1006) 0.000 0.006 
Exper/10 -1.445***(.4669) 
-1.377***
(.4657) 
-3.500***
(.5976) 
-3.393***
(.7047) 0.007 0.017 
AFQT*Exper/10  -0.148***(.0471)  
0.0117 
(.1575)  0.330 
Adjusted R-squared 0.026 0.029 0.071 0.071   
N 7,406 7,194 2,970 2,850   
Additional Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Note: All specifications include a year fixed effect and squared and cubic terms for potential experience. 
Specifications (2) and (4) additionally control for the location of the residence and an urban residence. In columns 
(5) and (6), we report the p-values for the difference in the coefficients from specifications (1) and (3) as well as 
(2) and (4), respectively. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. *** significant at the 
1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.  
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However, the results for college graduates display different patterns. The result 
in column (4) suggests that unlike high school graduates, the number of jobs does 
not depend positively on AFQT scores for college graduates. The coefficients for 
both AFQT scores and the interaction term are either negative and/or statistically 
insignificant for college graduate workers. These results suggest that other factors 
that do not depend on the abilities of workers may be the major determinants of job 
mobility among young college graduates. 
Overall, the results show that for the number of jobs, different patterns emerge 
among high school and college graduate workers. These differences could shed 
light on the source of the return from job mobility described in Topel and Ward 
(1992). As the number of jobs reflects job mobility, our results suggest that the 
return from the number of jobs among high school graduates arises from the 
correlation between ability—which is positively related to wages in the long run—
and job mobility. 
 
V. Conclusion and Discussion 
 
In this paper, we document the difference between the subsequent careers of 
high school and college graduate workers based on the role of higher education in 
revealing abilities. In particular, we argue that high-ability high school graduates 
will actively engage in productivity revealing-activities while high-ability college 
graduates will not actively participate in those activities. Moreover, we expect that 
high-ability high school graduates will tend to have more jobs than low-ability high 
school graduates at the beginning of their careers as they move to better jobs. 
Unlike high school graduates, college graduates do not exhibit such a pattern in the 
number of jobs given that high-ability college graduates will have decent jobs from 
the beginning of their career and will not have an incentive to move between jobs 
at the cost of firm-specific human capital. Using NLSY79 data, we test our 
hypotheses by regressing the measure of productivity-revealing activities and the 
number of jobs on the measure of ability separately for high school graduates and 
college graduates. Overall, the empirical pattern is fairly consistent with our 
hypotheses. Therefore, our findings highlight the importance of the role of higher 
education to understand the post-schooling behavior of high school and college 
graduates. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Although our main results are based on a sample of white males, we also 
perform the same analysis based on a sample containing all racial groups – white, 
black and Hispanic. The sample used in this Appendix is restricted to males only. 
Table A1 documents the regression results using the estimating equation (1) with 
the same dependent variables used in the main text. In addition to the control 
variables in the main analysis, we included dummy variables indicating racial 
groups. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the main results. 
 
TABLE A1—RESULTS BASED ON ALL RACIAL GROUPS 
 
High School College Test: College=HS P-value 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Dependent Variable=Log Real Wage 
AFQT 0.0800*** (.0112) 
0.00100 
(.017) 
0.172*** 
(.0343) 
0.153** 
(.0593) 0.011 0.013 
AFQT* 
Exper/10  
0.114*** 
(.0242)  
0.0647 
(.0869) 0.002 0.316 
Panel B: Dependent Variable=OFT 
AFQT 0.0108*** (.0029) 
0.0259*** 
(.0075) 
-0.00172 
(.0102) 
-0.0412* 
(.0242) 0.238 0.001 
AFQT* 
Exper/10  
-0.0233** 
(.0113)  
0.0808** 
(.0359)  0.009 
Panel C: Dependent Variable=Performance-pay Jobs 
AFQT 0.0315** (.0111) 
0.116** 
(.0572) 
-0.00750 
(.0335) 
-0.196** 
(.092) 0.268 0.196 
AFQT* 
Exper/10  
-0.0985 
(.0636)  
0.298** 
(.1413)  0.306 
Panel D: Dependent Variable=Number of Jobs 
AFQT 0.0647*** (.0146) 
0.149*** 
(.0361) 
-0.0723* 
(.0377) 
-0.151 
(.0988) 0.001 0.004 
AFQT* 
Exper/10  
-0.146*** 
(.0467)  
0.0276 
(.1553) 0.271 0.519 
Additional 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Note: All specifications include a year fixed effect and squared and cubic terms for potential experience. 
Specifications (2) and (4) additionally control for the location of the residence and an urban residence. In columns 
(5) and (6), we report the p-values for the difference in the coefficients from specifications (1) and (3) as well as 
(2) and (4), respectively. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. *** significant at the 
1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.  
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